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Abstract
One of the puzzling phenomena in philanthropy is that people can show strong compassion
for identified individual victims but remain unmoved by catastrophes that affect large num-
bers of victims. Two prominent findings in research on charitable giving reflect this idiosyn-
crasy: The (1) identified victim and (2) victim number effects. The first of these suggests that
identifying victims increases donations and the second refers to the finding that people’s
willingness to donate often decreases as the number of victims increases. While these
effects have been documented in the literature, their underlying psychological processes
need further study. We propose a model in which identified victim and victim number effects
operate through different cognitive and affective mechanisms. In two experiments we pres-
ent empirical evidence for such a model and show that different affective motivations
(donor-focused vs. victim-focused feelings) are related to the cognitive processes of impact
judgments and mental imagery. Moreover, we argue that different mediation pathways exist
for identifiability and victim number effects.
Introduction
Humanitarian aid crises occur regularly throughout the world, including ongoing threats to
human life from natural and man-made disasters. In response to these catastrophes, a substan-
tial amount of money is donated annually to alleviate the suffering of those affected. A large
portion of these donations (i.e., 72% of the $358 billion given in the US in 2014) comes from
individual donors [1]. However, exactly how and when people decide to donate is still a hotly
debated topic. Research suggests that these types of decisions are multi-faceted and often deter-
mined by many factors [2].
One of the central phenomena in research on philanthropy is the finding that people experi-
ence much empathy for individual victims but can remain largely unmoved by catastrophes
that affect many people [3, 4]. Moreover, as the number of people at risk increases, helping
responses can become scope insensitive (i.e., they are not sensitive to the number of people in
need; [5]). Several studies have implicated different affective and cognitive mechanisms essen-
tial in the perception and processing of information related to valuations of lives (e.g., [6–20]).
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Two prominent findings highlight the importance of understanding the psychological pro-
cesses underlying the valuation of lives in charitable contexts: The (1) identified victim and (2)
victim number effects. The former refers to the fact that identifying the people in need often
increases donors’ willingness to contribute to a charitable cause (e.g., [8]). The latter refers to
the negative effect of being confronted with larger numbers of victims on donors’ willingness
to help (e.g., [12]).
Processes underneath identifiability and victim number effects
Both identifiability and victim number effects have been linked to affective processes. Affective
explanations are based on the idea that helping behavior is often motivated by pro-social emo-
tions [21]. Presenting identified (vs. unidentified) victims is assumed to result in higher dona-
tions because they generate stronger emotions in the donor [12, 13, 17, 22]. It is easier to attach
emotional impressions to an identified victim due to a more concrete mental representation [3,
23, 24]. Presenting an unidentified victim, on the other hand, may engage less affective process-
ing and reduce people’s willingness to help [18, 25]. The effect of identification is not limited to
pro-social emotions and charitable giving [10, 11, 26] and can also decrease helping when vic-
tims can be blamed for their predicament [11]. However, even in these circumstances the effect
of identification can be explained by stronger emotional reactions. Evidence exists that the pos-
itive effect of identification on donations is particularly strong for single victims [12]. Charities
often make use of this fact by presenting single, individual victims to represent a specific
humanitarian aid cause. Instead of showing the staggering statistics of people in need, present-
ing a single individual is a common practice to increase donations.
The singularity effect represents a specific form of insensitivity to the number of victims. As
the number of lives at risk increases, donors can become less inclined to contribute in general
[3]. Moreover, being confronted with many lives at risk can have a detrimental effect on
donors’ willingness to contribute even to a single victim. Supporting this notion, Small and col-
leagues [18] found that presenting background statistics about the total number of lives at risk
reduced participants’ donation amounts to one victim. Their results can be interpreted as evi-
dence for an affective account of the “drop-in-the-bucket effect”, such that the inclusion of
background statistics hinders the generation of prosocial emotions.
However, recently an alternative explanation has been proposed that capitalizes on the
importance of perceived impact of a donation [27–31]. Presenting background statistics can
make it obvious that helping only a few victims will not alleviate the suffering of all (or even
most) people affected and therefore each individual donation does not seem to make much of a
difference in the big picture. Evaluating the impact (i.e., usefulness) of a donation against the
backdrop of a much larger tragedy can lead to drop-in-the-bucket effects and demotivate giv-
ing. Research on perceived impact suggests that affective responses (such as empathy) play a
smaller role in donation decisions than previously assumed. For example, Erlandsson and col-
leagues [29]; see also [30] found that the perceived utility of a donation mediates the propor-
tion dominance effect in charitable giving (i.e., people preferring to help a larger proportion
even if this means helping a lower absolute number of victims). Likewise, Cryder and col-
leagues [27] suggest that the perceived impact of a donation may be a better predictor than
sympathy towards charitable causes.
The dance of affect and impact
It is unclear to which extent explanations based on impact judgments can supplant affective
accounts of identifiability and victim number effects. Considering impact judgments as a moti-
vator for charitable giving has intuitive merit because donors like their donation to be effective.
Processes in Charitable Giving
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It may also be difficult to rationalize spending money on something that has little chance of
succeeding. While this line of reasoning does not dispute that identifiability and victim number
effects can operate through more concrete mental images, the effects of these images are not
assumed to be affective in nature [27]. However, it is also possible that impact judgments give
rise to emotions instrumental in prosocial behavior.
While feelings related to the victims (e.g., sympathy and compassion) might not depend on
impact judgments, feelings related to the donor (e.g., feeling good about oneself for donating or
regretting not supporting a charitable cause) certainly could. If a particular project is deemed
to be effective, donors may feel good about themselves for supporting it. This feeling has been
described as “warm glow” in the literature [32, 33] and in our work we have also found donor-
focused feelings to correspond to impact judgments and donations [25]. Just like impact judg-
ments, donor-focused feelings could be reduced when the donation is perceived as a drop in
the bucket (e.g., when victim statistics are presented). To get a better understanding of the
effects of impact judgments and how they influence donor- and victim-focused feelings, a
more thorough investigation is needed.
Overview of studies
Here we propose a model that incorporates both explanations (i.e., perceived impact and affect) and
highlights how the different processes are related to each other as well as to donations. We hypothe-
size that the processes through which identifiability influences donations are primarily related to
mental imagery and victim-focused feelings (e.g., sympathy). This reasoning is in line with Slovic
[3], who argued that clearer mental images give rise to empathic feelings (see also [24] for a more
general argument onmental imagery and affect). In the current studies mental imagery refers to the
coherence and cohesiveness by which an image of the victim(s) can be mentally formed. Thus, we
conceptualize mental imagery by the consistency and unity of a mental representation.
Conversely, the effect of changes in victim number may be more related to the perceived
impact of a donation [29] and subsequent feelings related to the donor (i.e., to regret not donat-
ing). As the number of lives at risk increases, it is likely that any donation is seen as less effec-
tive and people will be less likely to regret withholding their financial support [34]. We
postulate that although impact judgments are an important consideration, their effect on dona-
tion decisions is best understood by their influence on affective reactions of the donor. Based
on this reasoning, we expect the following mediation:
1. Identifiability!Mental Image! Victim-focused emotions (Sympathy)! Donations
2. Victim Number! Impact! Donor-focused emotions (Regret)! Donations
To test these pathways, we present two studies that manipulate identifiability and number
of lives at risk. Whereas Study 1 is a reanalysis of an already published data set on the effects of
victim numbers and identifiability on hypothetical donation amounts [6], Study 2 is a concep-
tual replication that uses real donations and manipulates victim numbers through the presenta-
tion of background statistics.
Ethics statement
All studies in this paper were conducted in accordance with all applicable human subjects
guidelines, procedures, rules, and regulations in effect in the country in which the research was
conducted, and in full accordance with international ethics for research and human subjects
guidelines, including the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Study 1 was conducted at the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn,
Germany. The Max Planck Institute does not have an IRB from which to obtain ethical
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approval. No formal body at the Institute is empowered to grant approval for research not of a
clinical or medical nature (and Study 1 does not constitute either clinical or medical research),
nor does German law require such approval. Therefore the work conducted in Germany com-
plied with German law and followed ethical guidelines for research at the Max Planck Institute.
Study 2 was conducted in Eugene, Oregon, USA and was approved by the local IRB at the Uni-
versity of Oregon.
In both studies, participants received information about the study and gave their written
informed consent prior to participating, they were compensated for their participation, proce-
dures were in place to protect their confidentiality, and they were thoroughly debriefed.
Data for Study 1 and Study 2 can be found in S1 Dataset 1 and S2 Dataset 2.
Study 1: Hypothetical Donation Request
Method
Participants. One-hundred and sixty-eight participants (M = 23.9, SD = 5.1; 62% women)
took part in Study 1, which was included in a larger experimental battery that lasted about one
hour. Participants were recruited from a subject pool of the University of Bonn, Germany, and
included students as well as community members. They were compensated with 12 Euros
(approximately $15) for their participation.
Design, Materials, and Procedure. As part of this 2 (identified vs. unidentified) x 2 (num-
ber of victims: 1 vs. 5) between-subjects study, participants were first presented with hypotheti-
cal donation requests that depicted either one or five African children. Participants were told
that these children are in danger of starvation and that donations to an internationally accred-
ited humanitarian aid organization working with these children will help reduce their hunger.
Children were either identified by pictures and names (identified condition) or remained
nameless and faceless (unidentified condition). In the identified condition, participants either
saw one picture or five pictures, whereas in the unidentified condition the number of children
in need of help was communicated by a number (1 vs. 5). Participants were further told that
this child was (these five children were) part of a larger group of 100 children who faced the
same predicament and also needed financial help to survive. However, participants were only
able to contribute to the one child (or five children). After reading the donation request, partic-
ipants indicated their donation amount and (on a scale of 1 = “not at all” to 7 = “very much”)
how much sympathy they felt towards the one child (five children), how much they would
regret not donating, how coherent and cohesive their mental impression of the child (five chil-
dren) was, and how much a donation would improve (i.e., impact) the life of the child (five
children).
Results
Data analyses. In this part of the analysis we were primarily interested in the mediating
role of impact judgments, mental images, as well as donor and victim-focused feelings (i.e., regret
and sympathy, respectively). We will first present a mediation analysis of the hypothesized path-
ways with bootstrapping according to Preacher and Hayes [35] and then use structural equation
modeling (SEM) to conduct a path analyses and further evaluate model fit and alternative media-
tion models. Prior to analyses, donation amounts were winsorized at 250 Euros (less than 6% of
the data) and log-transformed (ln(x+1)) to reduce skewness (for descriptive data of all variables,
see Table 1). For the mediation analyses of identifiability effects, the data were collapsed across
victim numbers. Similarly, for the mediation analyses for victim number effects, the data were
collapsed across identifiability.
Processes in Charitable Giving
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Mediation of identifiability effects. To test for possible mediation of identifiability effects
through mental images and sympathy, we conducted a set of analyses with multiple mediators
([35, 36]). Results are presented in Table 2. As expected, identifiability predicted mental
images, (MIdentified = 3.71, SD = 1.70;MUnidentified = 2.99, SD = 1.66), ß = .20, p = .008. More-
over, more coherent mental images predicted higher sympathy, ß = .17, p = .029, and higher
sympathy predicted greater donation amounts, ß = .29, p< .001. Importantly, a significant
indirect effect emerged from the data, b = .010, 95%-CI [.001, .032]. Thus, the effect of iden-
tifiability on donation amounts can be explained by the serial mediating effect of mental imag-
ery and sympathy. Once this indirect effect on donations is accounted for, neither
identifiability nor mental images significantly predicted donations. These results suggest that
people donate more to identified victims by virtue of the mental images these victims induce.
More coherent mental images, in turn, can lead to stronger sympathy for the donation recipi-
ents. Further analyses also revealed that the indirect effect of identifiability on donations can-
not be explained by impact judgments and regret as serial mediators, b = -.005, 95%-CI [–.027,
.017].
Mediation of victim number effects. We next analyzed whether manipulations of victim
number operate indirectly through impact judgments and regret. Contrary to our expectations,
we did not find any direct (p> .667) or indirect effects, b = -.003, 95%-CI [–.023, .018] of vic-
tim numbers on donations through these mediators. However, independently of the victim
number manipulation we found a direct effect of impact judgments on donations, ß = .34, p<
.001, a direct effect of regret on donations, ß = .41, p< .001, and a significant indirect effect of
impact judgments through regret on donations, b = .129, 95%-CI [.066, .203]. This result sug-
gests that the effect of impact judgments on donations, at least partially, can be explained by its
influence on participants’ regret towards not donating. Further analyses also showed that no
indirect effect emerged when using mental imagery and sympathy as serial mediators for victim
number, b = -.002, 95% CI [–.015, .005].
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 and Study 2.
Study 1 Study 2
All Ident
Single
Ident
Group
Unident
Single
Unident
Group
All Ident
Single
Ident
Statistics
Unident
Single
Unident
Statistics
Willingness to
donate
80.4% 88.1% 85.0% 67.4% 81.4% 67.3% 69.0% 69.0% 69.0% 61.9%
Donations (raw) 45.96
(67.27)
64.05
(77.22)
35.18
(48.59)
33.16
(55.91)
51.14
(78.87)
2.84
(3.67)
2.76
(4.02)
2.71 (2.98) 3.26 (4.23) 2.62 (3.42)
Donations
(transform)
2.70
(1.74)
3.22
(1.69)
2.72
(1.52)
2.15 (1.84) 2.74 (1.78) 0.98
(0.84)
0.94
(0.84)
1.01 (0.80) 1.04 (0.90) 0.93 (0.85)
Mental Image 3.34
(1.72)
3.81
(1.67)
3.60
(1.75)
3.02 (1.75) 2.95 (1.59) 3.04
(1.74)
3.60
(1.87)
3.12 (1.63) 2.86 (1.75) 2.62 (1.64)
Sympathy 5.31
(1.50)
5.60
(1.33)
5.13
(1.44)
5.28 (1.44) 5.24 (1.76) 5.10
(1.59)
5.39
(1.34)
5.33 (1.44) 4.64 (1.67) 5.02 (1.80)
Impact 4.02
(1.70)
4.10
(1.79)
3.83
(1.28)
4.02 (1.87) 4.14 (1.79) 2.82
(1.57)
3.12
(1.74)
2.69 (1.42) 2.95 (1.65) 2.50 (1.41)
Regret 3.66
(1.88)
3.76
(1.88)
3.60
(1.66)
3.60 (1.95) 3.67 (2.06) 3.67
(2.12)
3.78
(2.20)
3.54 (2.20) 4.02 (1.89) 3.36 (2.20)
N 168 42 40 43 43 168 42 42 42 42
Note. Donations (transform) refer to winzorised and log-transformed donation amounts in Study 1 and log-transformed donation amounts in Study 2;
Donations (raw) refer to winzorised donation amounts in Study 1 (at 250 Euro) and raw donations in Study 2. Ident = Identiﬁed Victim Condition,
Unident = Unidentiﬁed Victim Condition; Means are presented with their standard deviation in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148274.t001
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Path analysis: Identifiability. We used Stata 13 [37] to conduct a path analysis with SEM
in order to further test the hypothesized mediation and evaluate the likelihood of competing
models that include the non-hypothesized pathways and the reversed order of mediators. Con-
sistent with the analyses reported above, we examine the effects of identifiability and victim
number separately. In this analysis we consider models with one and two pathways from the
independent variable to donations, each pathway consisting of two mediators. Direct effects of
identifiability and victim number on donations are not included, as we are primarily interested
in the indirect effects. However, we do allow direct effects of all mediators to the dependent
variable.
The hypothesized indirect pathway for the effect of identifiability on donation amounts
with mental images and sympathy as serial mediators (Model 1, see Table 3) showed good
Table 2. Summary of the Main Mediation Results with Bootstrapping for Study 1 and Study 2.
Study1 Study 2
Analyses for Identiﬁability Effects
Direct effects
Identiﬁability! Image ß = .20** ß = .18*
Image! Sympathy ß = .17* ß = .37***
Identiﬁability! Sympathy ß < .01 ß = .10
Image! Donation ß = .10 ß = .14+
Sympathy! Donation ß = .29*** ß = .08
Identiﬁability! Donation ß = .12 ß = –.06
Indirect effects
Identiﬁability! Image! Sympathy! Donation CI [.001, .032], b = .010; R2 = .129 CI [–.003, .027], b = .005; R2 = .040
Identiﬁability! Sympathy! Image! Donation CI [–.001, .011], b = .001; R2 = .129 CI [–.001, .030], b = .010; R2 = .040
Identiﬁability! Impact! Regret! Donation CI [–.027, .017], b = -.005; R2 = .400 CI [–.012, .034], b = .008; R2 = .224
N 167 166
Analysis for Victim Number Effects
Direct effects
Victim number! Impact ß = –.02 ß = –.14+
Impact! Regret ß = .32*** ß = .30***
Victim number! Regret ß = –.01 ß = –.04
Impact! Donation ß = .34*** ß = .17*
Regret! Donation ß = .41*** ß = .40***
Victim number! Donation ß = .03 ß = .03
Indirect effects
Victim number! Impact! Regret! Donation CI [–.023, .018], b = -.003; R2 = .375 CI [–.055,–.001], b = -.017; R2 = .224
Impact! Regret! Donation CI [.066, .203], b = .129; R2 = .374 CI [.056, .235], b = .123; R2 = .223
Victim number! Regret! Impact! Donation CI [–.020, .017], b = -.001; R2 = .375 CI [–.025, .001], b = -.004; R2 = .224
Victim number! Image! Sympathy!Donation CI [–.015, .005], b = -.002; R2 = .118 CI [–.022, .002], b = -.003; R2 = .039
N 168 159
Note. Parameters are estimated for full models; varying N results from missing values; indirect effects were estimated at point estimates and 95%
conﬁdence intervals with 1000 bootstrapping samples; signiﬁcant CIs do not include zero and are in boldface; Image = Mental Image
+p  .10
*p  .05
**p  .01
***p  .001
Analyses with non-transformed data revealed similar patterns of results.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148274.t002
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model fit (i.e., this model was not significantly different from a fully specified model, Χ2 (2,
N = 168) = 2.7, p = .26) with a CFI = .977 and RMSEA = .046 (usually values of CFI> .90 and
RMSEA< .05 provide evidence for good model fit [38]). Reversing the order of mediators (i.e.,
sympathy!mental images; Model 2) reduces model fit (CFI = .732 and RMSEA = .155) and
produces a model significantly worse than a fully specified model, X2 (2, N = 168) = 10.04, p<
.01. To test which order of mediators better fits the data, we use Bayesian information Criteria
(BIC). Smaller BICs indicate better model fit, and the difference in BICs can be used to com-
pare models. We will follow Raftery’s [39] recommendation of interpreting differences in BICs
of two models in the following way: BIC differences of 0–2 are interpreted as weak evidence,
BIC differences of 2–6 are indicative of positive evidence, BIC differences of 6–10 are indicative
of strong evidence, and BIC differences> 10 are indicative of very strong evidence for the
superior model (see also [40]). Thus, the observed difference in BICs (ΔBIC = 7.4) for the two
models (Models 1 & 2) provides strong evidence for the hypothesized order of mediators (i.e.,
mental images! sympathy), with a posterior probability for the hypothesized model Pr
(Model 1|ΔBIC = 7.4) = .976.
We next examined whether adding the indirect pathway through impact and regret
improved model fit (Model 3). Comparing the model that specifies two indirect pathways
against the hypothesized model with only indirect effects through mental imagery and sympa-
thy shows very strong support for the hypothesized model, Pr(Model 1|ΔBIC = 1302.1)> .999.
We also compared Model 3 to a reduced model in which all four mediators are present but the
pathway from identifiability to impact was constrained to 0 (Model 4). A likelihood ratio test
revealed that including the indirect pathway to impact judgments (and therefore the indirect
pathway through the non-hypothesized mediators; Model 3) does not improve model fit com-
pared to Model 4, X2(1, N = 168) = 0.2, p = .651. In fact, comparing the differences in BICs
(ΔBIC = 4.9) provides evidence that Model 4 is more likely than Model 3, Pr(Model 4|
ΔBIC = 4.9) = .92. These analyses provide strong support for the hypothesis that the effects of
identifiability are mediated by mental imagery and sympathy (in this order) in Study 1.
Path analysis: Victim number. A similar path analysis was conducted to examine the
model fit for the effects of victim number on donations with impact and regret as serial
mediators. Results showed that the models with a single pathway (Models 5 & 6, Table 3) fit
the data equally well and are not significantly different from a fully specified model, X2 (2,
N = 168)< 0.25, ps> .88. We find no evidence that one order of mediators is superior
Table 3. Model Fit for Path Analyses, Study 1.
Model Pathway X2 Model parameters CFI RMSEA BIC
1 ID—MI—SY—DO 2.7 4 .977 .046 2421.5
2 ID—SY—MI—DO 10.04** 4 .732 .155 2428.9
3 ID—MI—SY—DO & ID—IM—RE—DO 37.56*** 8 .776 .161 3723.6
4 ID—MI—SY—DO & IM—RE—DO 37.77*** 7 .781 .149 3718.7
5 VN—IM—RE—DO 0.19 4 1 < .01 2435.1
6 VN—RE—IM—DO 0.25 4 1 < .01 2435.1
7 VN—IM—RE -DO & VN—MI—SY-DO 33.16*** 8 .790 .149 3731.1
8 VN—IM—RE—DO & MI—SY—DO 33.47*** 7 .795 .138 3726.3
Note. X2 denotes model ﬁt compared to a fully speciﬁed model with all pathways speciﬁed. Model parameters represent number of estimated pathway
coefﬁcients. ID = identiﬁability; MI = mental imagery, SY = sympathy; VN = victim number; IM = impact judgments; RE = regret; DO = donations.
**p < .01
***p < .001
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148274.t003
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(ΔBIC = 0.6). This is likely the result of allowing each mediator to directly correlate with dona-
tions. In fact, when constraining the models to only include indirect effects (and no direct path-
way from the first mediator to donations) then the model with the hypothesized order of
mediators (Model 5) outperforms the competing model (Model 6), Pr(Model 5| ΔBIC = 9.7) =
.993, and suggests that impact judgments precede participants’ regret. Including the other indi-
rect pathway (mental image! sympathy; Model 7) did not improve model fit in comparison
to Model 8, which constrains the pathway from victim numbers to mental image to 0, X2 (1,
N = 168) = 0.31, p = .578. Moreover, given the differences in BICs, Model 7 was less likely than
Model 8, Pr(Model 8|ΔBIC = 4.8)> .917, and the hypothesized Model 5, Pr(Model 5|
ΔBIC = 1296)> .999. However, contrary to our expectations and as already revealed by the
mediation analysis with bootstrapping, the indirect pathway of victim number on donations
through impact and regret was not significant, z = –0.27, p = .786.
Discussion
Taken together, results from both the mediation analyses with bootstrapping and path analyses
suggest that the effects of identifiability on donations can best be explained through their influ-
ence on mental imagery and, subsequently, sympathetic responses. This is in line with prior
research highlighting the specific cognitive underpinnings of affective responses in prosocial
behavior [3, 6, 27].
Contrary to our expectations, no significant indirect effects of increasing victim number on
donations through impact and regret emerged from the data. However, a separate mediation
analysis found that, regardless of the number of victims, the effect of perceived impact was
mediated by regret. One possibility for the lack of direct and indirect effects regarding the num-
ber of victims could be related to the fact that we did not use real donations in Study 1. More-
over, in Study 1 the manipulation of victim number included a constant reference group (i.e.,
100) in both victim number conditions. This could have attracted attention away from the
actual donation recipients (1. vs. 5) and masked differences in participants’ impact judgments,
regret, and donation responses. It is also possible that impact judgments depend more on the
total number of people at risk rather than the subset of people one can help.
Study 2: Real Donation Request
To extend the findings from Study 1, we present a second study in which participants were
confronted with real donation requests. We also examined the proposed mediation model
when using a different manipulation of victim numbers. In Study 2, we increased the number
of lives at risk by a background statistics manipulation similar to Small and colleagues [18]. In
their design, participants were either provided with background statistics about the humanitar-
ian aid problem (i.e., the total number of people in need of help) or received no information on
background statistics. The identifiability manipulation in Study 2 was similar to the one used
in Study 1 (name and picture vs. none).
Method
Participants. For this study, 168 university students (undergraduate and graduate) and
community members were recruited on campus at the University of Oregon (Mage = 25.8
years, SD = 7.6; 51% women). The study was part of a larger survey with unrelated experiments
which lasted about one hour. As compensation for their efforts, participants received $14. In
this Study, we collected real donations and participants could use their monetary compensation
to donate to a child in need.
Processes in Charitable Giving
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Design and Materials. This study employed a 2 (identified vs. unidentified) x 2 (back-
ground statistics vs. no background statistics) between-subjects design. Participants’ willing-
ness to donate was assessed by asking for financial contributions to the humanitarian aid
organization Save the Children to alleviate the severe food crisis in Southern Africa. Victim
identifiability was manipulated by presenting half of the participants with identifying informa-
tion of the victim while the other half was only informed that they would be able to donate to
“a child in Africa.” In the identified condition, participants were presented with a picture, the
name (Rokia) and age (7 years old) of the child in need. In the unidentified condition, partici-
pants only read about a child in need and were not given any identifying information. Specifi-
cally, the story about the child was presented as follows:
“Rokia (the child) is desperately poor, and faces a threat of severe hunger or even starvation.
Her (his or her) life will be changed for the better as a result of your financial gift. With your
support, and the support of other caring sponsors, Save the Children will work with Rokia’s
(this child’s) family and other members of the community to help feed her and provide her
(him or her) with education, as well as basic medical care and hygiene.”
Victim numbers were conceptualized as the presence versus absence of background statis-
tics on the total number of children at risk. Specifically, half of the participants were told that
Rokia (the child) is “one of 20,000 needy children in the same region who are desperately
poor.” The other half of the participants were not shown any background statistics and were
only informed about Rokia (the one child).
Procedure. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to
one of the four conditions and given the study materials together with their participant fee
($14). They could donate any portion of this participant fee. Participants completed the materi-
als individually and in a separate room. After reading the donation request, they were asked to
indicate their donation amounts to Rokia (the child in need). Furthermore, we assessed partici-
pants’ feelings (e.g., sympathy and regret), mental image of the victim, and impact of a dona-
tion on 7-point response scales as in Study 1. Finally, to minimize experimenter demand
effects on participants’ donations, participants were asked to put the completed questionnaire
and their donation amount in an envelope, seal it and return it to the experimenter.
Results and Discussion
Data analyses. Means and standard deviations for all dependent variables are presented in
Table 1. We again used mediation analyses to look at both direct and indirect effects. Donation
amounts were log-transformed prior to analysis. As in Study 1, we first present the results of a
mediation analysis with bootstrapping and then conduct a path analyses with SEM.
Mediation of identifiability effects. A significant effect of identifiability on mental images
demonstrated that images for the identified victim were more coherent (MIdentified = 3.35,
SD = 1.75) than images for the unidentified victim (MUnidentified = 2.74, SD = 1.69), ß = .18, p =
.022. Likewise, more coherent mental images predicted higher sympathy, ß = .37, p< .001.
Donation amounts are marginally predicted by mental image, ß = .16, p = .054, while donation
amounts are not predicted by sympathy (ß = .08, p = .360) or identifiability (ß = –.05, p = .567).
However, the predicted indirect effect with mental image and sympathy as mediators between
identifiability and donation amounts did not reach conventional significance, b = .005, 95%-CI
[–.003, .027]. A mediation with the reversed order of mediators, with sympathy preceding
mental images, also did not show a significant effect, b = .010, 95%-CI [-.001, .030]. As in Study
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1, a mediation of identifiability through impact judgments and regret did not find significant
effects in Study 2, b = .008, 95%-CI [–.012, .034].
Mediation of victim number effects. While the direct effect of victim number on dona-
tion amounts was not significant, ß< .03, p = .646, we found a marginally significant direct
effect of the victim number manipulation on impact judgments, ß = –.14, p = .081. Presenting a
single victim resulted in slightly higher impact ratings (M = 3.04, SD = 1.68) than presenting a
single victim with background statistics (M = 2.59, SD = 1.41). In the next step, regret is pre-
dicted by impact, ß = .30, p< .001, but not by victim number, ß = –.04, p = .569. Donation
amounts are predicted by impact, ß = .17, p = .030 and regret, ß = .40, p< .001, as expected.
Confirming our hypothesis regarding the mechanisms behind victim number effects, we found
a significant indirect effect through impact and regret on donations, b = -.017, 95%-CI
[–.055,–.001]. Reversing the order of mediators (i.e., first regret then impact judgments) did
not reveal a significant indirect effect, b = -.004, 95%-CI [–.025, .001]. Accordingly, presenting
victim statistics (and thereby increasing the total number of people in need) led to lower impact
judgments, which predicted participants’ regret for not donating and subsequent donations. As
in Study 1, we found no evidence for an indirect effect through mental imagery and sympathy
for the manipulation of victim number, b = -.003, 95% CI [–.022, .002].
Path analysis: Identifiability. Next we present the path analyses for Study 2, which were
conducted to evaluate model fit of the hypothesized and competing models. Results are pre-
sented in Table 4 and include separate analyses for identifiability and victim number effects.
As in Study 1, we conducted a path analysis with SEM to examine the quality of different
mediation models to explain identifiability effects. Results of Study 2 again show good fit for
the model with the hypothesized indirect pathway with mental images and sympathy as serial
mediators (Model 1), X2 (2, N = 168) = 2.33, p = .311) with a CFI = .979 and RMSEA = .046.
Model fit remains good when reversing the order of mediators (Model 2), X2 (2, N = 168) =
2.91, p = .233, CFI = .974, RMSEA = .052. The difference in BICs for both models is relatively
small, with no clear evidence for a particular order of mediators, Pr(Model 1|ΔBIC = 0.58) =
.571. While the hypothesized indirect effect for Model 1 was marginally significant (z = 1.67,
p = .094), the indirect effect for the reversed order of mediators was not (z = 1.35, p = .176).
Using non-transformed data reveals a similar pattern of results, however the indirect effects
do not reach conventional significance levels (p = .119 and p = .192 for Model 1 and 2,
respectively.)
Table 4. Model Fit for Path Analyses, Study 2.
Model Pathway X2 Model parameters CFI RMSEA BIC
1 ID—MI—SY—DO 2.33 4 .979 .046 2158.5
2 ID—SY—MI—DO 2.91 4 .974 .052 2159.1
3 ID—MI—SY—DO & ID—IM—RE—DO 57.79*** 8 .615 .208 3496.5
4 ID—MI—SY—DO & IM—RE—DO 58.39*** 7 .618 .194 3491.9
5 VN—IM—RE—DO 1.39 4 1 < .01 2203.1
6 VN—RE—IM—DO 2.86 4 .984 .05 2204.6.1
7 VN—IM—RE -DO & VN—MI—SY-DO 57.92*** 8 .612 .208 3497.3
8 VN—IM—RE—DO & MI—SY—DO 59.61*** 7 .606 .196 3493.8
Note: X2 denotes model ﬁt compared to a fully speciﬁed model with all pathways speciﬁed. Model parameters represent number of estimated pathway
coefﬁcients. ID = identiﬁability; MI = mental imagery, SY = sympathy; VN = victim number; IM = impact judgments; RE = regret; DO = donations.
***p < .001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148274.t004
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Next we tested whether adding the indirect pathway through impact and regret increased
model fit (Model 3). As in Study 1, results show strong support for the model with only the
hypothesized indirect pathway through mental images and sympathy, Pr(Model 1|ΔBIC = 1337.9)
> .999. Comparing Model 3 to a reduced model with the pathway from identifiability to impact
judgments constrained to 0 (Model 4) again showed that including this indirect pathway does not
improve model fit, X2(1,N = 168) = 0. 6, p = .439. Also, as in Study 1, the differences in BICs show
that Model 4 is more likely thanModel 3, Pr(Model 4|ΔBIC = 4.8) = .916.
Path analysis: Victim number. The path analysis with impact and regret as serial mediators
showed that the models with a single pathway (Models 5 & 6) are both not significantly different
from a fully specified model, X2 (2,N = 168)< 2.86, p> .24. Although the indirect effect is mar-
ginally significant with the hypothesized order of mediators (impact! regret), z = –1.67, p = .096,
and not significant for the reversed order of mediators (regret! impact), z = –1.36, p = .173, we
find only weak evidence that the Model 5 is superior to Model 6, Pr (Model 5|ΔBIC = 1.5) = .679.
Using non-transformed data reveals a similar pattern of results, such that the indirect effect for
Model 5 was marginally significant (p = .097) and not significant for Model 6 (p = .173).
Adding the indirect pathway through mental images and sympathy (Model 7) did not result
in a better fit compared to a model that constrained this pathway to 0 (Model 8), X2 (1,
N = 168) = 1.69, p = .193. Consistent with results from Study 1, differences in BICs suggest that
Model 7 is less likely than Model 8, Pr(Model 8|ΔBIC = 3.5) = .852. Moreover, we find strong
support for the hypothesized Model 5 with only one indirect pathway to be superior to the
model with both indirect pathways (Model 7), Pr (Model 5|ΔBIC = 1291)> .999.
General Discussion
The current research was designed to investigate the underlying mechanisms of two prominent
findings in charitable giving: identifiability and effects of victim numbers. We were particularly
interested in the mediating effects of donor- and victim-focused emotions as well as mental
imagery and impact judgments. Based on theoretical arguments that mental imagery has a
strong link to sympathy for victims in need of help (e.g., [3, 22]) we had hypothesized that
identifying donation recipients influences donation amounts through more coherent mental
imagery and higher sympathy. Conversely, manipulations of victim numbers (either as varying
numbers of donation recipients or as background statistics informing about the total number
of lives at risk) were expected to influence donation amounts through changing the perceived
impact of a donation as well as donor-focused feelings (e.g., regretting not to donate). This
hypothesis extends findings that show perceived impact of a donation to be important for
explaining proportion dominance in charitable giving [29] as well as overhead aversion effects
[31]. While research has emphasized these different processes as underlying motivators for
people’s willingness to donate (e.g., [25, 27]), it is unclear to which extent they are complimen-
tary or contrary in explaining identifiability and victim number effects.
Our results provide evidence for both mental imagery and perceived impact to be important
in the decision to donate, however these processes are triggered differently. Perceived impact of
a donation seems to be related to the number of lives at risk. This finding is in line with
research on the drop-in-the-bucket effect, which states that donors are not willing to contribute
if they can only help a small proportion of lives at risk [5, 9, 18, 28, 34, 41–43]. The positive
effects of identifying a victim, however, seem to operate more through mental images than
through impact judgments.
Based on these findings, we propose a mediation model that includes both underlying pro-
cesses and demonstrates when each mechanism is more probable in influencing donation deci-
sions. Consistent with a substantial amount of research, the present approach incorporates
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both affective and cognitive motivations for charitable giving, but it additionally assumes that
the final impetus to give is affective in nature. Study 1 showed that the effect of impact judg-
ments on donation amounts can be explained by donor-focused feelings and that identifiability
effects operate indirectly through more coherent mental images and stronger victim-focused
feelings (i.e., sympathy for the victims). Study 2 extended these findings by using real donations
and a different manipulation of victim numbers (i.e., background statistics). Presenting victim
statistics results in lower impact judgments, which were associated with lower donor-focused
feelings and lower donation amounts.
Although we generally found support for our hypotheses, the results should be evaluated
with some caution. While we found evidence across both studies for the mediating role of men-
tal imagery and sympathy (in this order) for identifiability effects, results for victim number
effects were less consistent. The difference in Studies 1 and 2 might have come from the fact
that we used real donations in Study 2, which would suggest that impact judgments and regret
ratings are different when real money is at stake. It is also conceivable that the change in the
victim number manipulations was responsible for the different findings. The background sta-
tistics in Study 2 describe a much larger humanitarian aid crisis compared to the numbers used
in Study 1. It is therefore possible that the effect of victim numbers is sensitive to the numbers
used in the manipulation. Research suggests that people’s willingness to help can decrease as
soon as more than one life is in danger [44], and we found slightly stronger effects for victim
numbers when many lives were at risk (Study 2). While the relationship between victim num-
bers and perceived impact undoubtedly needs further study, it is likely that boundary condi-
tions exist such that increases in victim numbers do not always lead to lower perceived impact.
Importantly, we did find consistent evidence across studies that the effect of impact judg-
ments on donations is mediated by donor-focused feelings (i.e., regret). Also, in Study 2 the
indirect effect of victim numbers went through impact judgments and then regret. It should
also be noted that, although we used similar manipulations of victim numbers as other research
(e.g., [18]), in our studies we did not find strong effects of varying victim numbers on dona-
tions. This may be due to the manipulation not being strong enough, but it may also point to
the possibility that other variables influence the effects of victim numbers (such as individual
differences in feelings; [44]).
Victim identification by means of pictures likely also does not have universal effects on will-
ingness to help. The pictures themselves need to facilitate a more coherent mental image and
evoke sympathy in order for the proposed mediation to work. In line with prior research on the
identified victim effect [12], we manipulated identifiability by showing pictures of the victim(s).
This is also similar to the common practice of charities using pictures of identified victims to
solicit donations. However, further research is needed to test whether the proposed explanation
of mental imagery and victim-focused feelings (e.g., sympathy) also hold for other manipulations
of identifiability [17]. Some authors argue that merely determining a victim (without further
identification) can increase prosocial behavior even if they are not presented in a way that
increases their vividness [17, 45]. Our results speak specifically to the effect of using visual imag-
ery, however it is unclear whether merely determining a victim has the same effect.
Moreover, in the current manuscript we treat identifiability and victim number effects inde-
pendently, although an argument can be made that it is easier to identify (and mentally repre-
sent) smaller groups of victims compared to larger groups [3, 46]. Indeed, some evidence exists
that, next to effects of identifiability, effects of victim numbers (e.g., singularity) are also related
to mental imagery. Results of Kogut and Ritov [12] can be explained by stronger mental imagery
for single victims; however this is especially the case when single victims were also identified.
Another potential limitation is that we measured the constructs in this paper with single
items. While single items can be successfully used to measure constructs that are sufficiently
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narrow [47], future studies should also assess perceived impact, mental imagery, and feelings
with multiple-item scales to increase reliability. For example, multi-item measures of mental
imagery could distinguish between vividness and ease of imagination as precursors of victim-
focused feelings.
Given the correlational nature of the mediating variables, the current analyses cannot defi-
nitely specify a causal direction between the mediators. However, the findings in our mediation
analyses are consistent with existing literature (e.g., [3, 23]) assuming that cognitive processes
such as mental imagery and impact judgments influence the generation of feelings. Neverthe-
less, a reverse causal order is also conceivable (although theoretically unlikely) such that people
experience feelings and tailor their impact judgments in a congruent way.
Finally, the mediation models that we test in this manuscript are primarily designed to
explain donations towards individual (and small groups of) victims. Future research should
investigate whether the same explanations also hold for donations towards charitable organiza-
tions. The presence of other victims that cannot be helped seems to reduce the willingness to
donate when the recipients are individuals [48] but this may not the case when the recipient is
a charitable cause or an NGO. Moreover, other research reports that under some conditions
empathy mediated donations to a single victim but not to charitable organizations [49].
Conclusions
Given the prominence of private donations for nonprofit organizations in the humanitarian
aid sector, it is vital to understand the foundations of people’s decisions to donate to charity.
Discovering the different psychological mechanisms and motivations in all their complexity
constitutes a particular challenge for researchers. Donation decisions are influenced by both
cognitive and affective processes, which can lead to non-normative and sometimes even irra-
tional giving behavior. The mediation model presented in this paper suggests that the underly-
ing mechanisms responsible for such non-normative donation behavior are different and
specific to how victims are presented. Stating the total number of lives at risk can have a nega-
tive effect on donations (via impact judgments and regret), while identifying victims can
increase donations through stronger mental imagery and sympathetic responses.
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